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1. Introduction 
Maribel Romero 
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There are two main approaches to the scopal properties of the N' -restrictors of 
which-phrases. One line attributes widest scope within the interrogative clause to 
the entire which-phrase, outside the question formation operator, often assumed to 
reside in Co. The result is Karttunen's ( 1 977) question denotation --exemplified in 
(1 b ) _ _  , 1 whose distinctive feature is that the semantic contribution of the N'­
restrictor of the which-phrase is  represented outside the so-called question 
nucleus, i .e. ,  outside the subformula "p= . . .  ". The second main avenue interprets 
the N' -restrictor of which-phrases somewhere inside the question nucleus, that is, 
under the scope of the question formation operator and possibly under other, 
further embedded operators. The outcome is Hamblin' s  ( 1 973) --or unselective 
binding-question meaning, as in ( lc) .  This paper will be concerned with this 
second line, which I will refer to as the base position line (as opposed to wide 
scope line). 
( 1 )  a. Which professor did Sonia upset? 
b. Wide scope line: 
AWAp.3x [ professor(x)(w) & p = Aw' .upset(x)(s)(w') ] 
c. Base position line: 
AWAp.3x [ p = AW' .  professor(x)(w'/w) & upset(x)(s)(w') ] 
This first version of the base position line faces some challenges. 
First, Reinhart (1992) observes that interpreting N'-restrictors of which 
phrases in the base position line sometimes yields truth conditions that are too 
weak. For example, the base position approach predicts (2b) to be a possible 
question meaning for (2a). Making the standard assumption that each proposition 
in the denotation of a question (in a given w) is a felicitous (true or false) answer 
to that question (in w) (see, e.g., Hamblin ( 1973 : 52)), (2b) wrongly preditcs (2c) 
or the abridged (2d) to be an acceptable answer to the interrogative (2aV 
(2) a. Who would be upset if we invited which philosopher? (Reinhart 1 992) 
b. AWAp.3xy [ p = AW' .'v'w"[ [invite(y)(we)(w") & 
philosopher(y)(w/w'/w") & w" is (maximally) similar to w' in any 
other respect] -+ upset(x)(w") ] ]  
c. # Patricia would be upset if we invited Donald Duck and Donald Duck 
is (w) I was (w") a philosopher. 
d. # Patricia would be upset if we invited Donald Duck. 
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Second, so-called functional readings are not yet captured (under neither 
line). So far, the propositions in the question denotation are built by quantifying 
over a variable of individual type. Such representation elicits the individual answer 
(3b), but it does not account for the functional answer (3c) (Engdahl 1 980, 1 986). 
(3) a. Which classmate of theirs do most kids like best? 
b. Mireia. 
c. Their deskmate. (Le., each kid likes a different classmate best) 
To solve both problems at once, the base position line utilizes choice 
functions and relativizes them to a given world.3 The current choice function 
analysis can be summarized as follows. 
Which-phrases range over choice functions (Engdahl 1 980, Reinhart 1 992 
for which-phrases; see also Matthewson 1 999, Kratzer 1 998, Reinhart 1 997 and 
Winter 1 997 for indefinites).4 The basic notion of choice function is defined under 
(4) and its use is exemplified under (5) :  
(4) (partial) Basic Choice Function definition: (Kratzer 1 998 : 1 67) 
A function f is a choice function (CH( f) it: for every set P in its domain, 
ttP) is a member ofP. 
(5) a. Who remembers who} would be offend�d if we invited which of her} 
philosophical rivals? 
b. AWIAp.3g,f [ CH(g) & CH(f) & p = AW2. g(person) remembers in W2 
(AW3Aq: 3h [CH(h) & q = AW4.'VWS [ invite(f([[philosophical rival of 
heI'S1]]I'h(person)ll (Wl/l/3/4/S»)(we)(ws) & Ws is (maximally) similar to W4 
in any other respect � offended(h(person» (ws)] ] ) ]  
Note that nothing prevents us, in principle, from evaluating the N'­
restrictor (one) of herj philosophical rivals with respect to any of the world 
variables in the formula (5b).  Reinhart ( 1 992, 1 997) notes that this is a dangerous 
situation, since picking Ws would bring us back to the weak truth condition 
problem: we should be able to choose a non-actual philosophical rival of g(1 )  for 
our answer as long as that individual is a philosophical rival of g( l )  in Ws . Given 
that this is contrary to intuitions, that is, given that the choice function seems to be 
forced to choose from the actual rivals -which I will call Transparency Effect--, a 
new notion of "choice" function is put forward and relativized to a given world, as 
in (6) (von Stechow 1 996, formalizing Reinhart 1 992). Note that now the domain 
of the choice function does not contain extensional sets,S but properties. No matter 
how intensionally embedded ttP <s,et» is, ttP) yields an element ofP(w), where w is 
the evaluation world of the question. (5b') is the new question meaning for (5a) . 
(6) (partial) Relativized "Choice" function wrt w: (von Stechow 1 996: 1 3) 
A function t::<s,et>, e> is a relativized choice function (RCH(f) wrt w 
(RCH(f)(w» it: for every P in its domain, ftP) is a member ofP(w) . 
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(5) b' .  AWIAp.3g,f [RCH(g)(WI) & RCH(f)(WI) & p = AW2.g(person) 
remembers in W2 
(AW3Aq: 3h [RCH(h)(W3) & q = AW4.'VWS [ invite (f( [[Philosophicai 
rival ofhers1] ]g'h(person)/l) (we)(ws) & Ws is (maximally) similar to W4 in 
any other respect � offended(h(person))(ws)] ] ) ] 
There is yet another circumstance to consider: what happens if the N'­
restrictor denotes the empty set in the question evaluation world, as in (7a)? Two 
main strategies are possible. The first one is to consider that choice functions are 
partial -as in the definitions so far-- and that the empty set is not in their domain. 
This predicts that (7a) is unfelicitous in the actual world Wo, given that there is no 
felicitous answer for it in wo.6 The second strategy maintains that choice functions 
are total functions and that they yield a falsifying object when the N' -restrictor 
denotes the empty set, as suggested in von Stechow ( 1996:4f), Reinhart 
(1997:39 1fl) and Winter ( 1 997:434fl). For the sake of illustration, I spell out von 
Stechow's implementation of this strategy under (8). Here, the prediction is that all 
propositions in [ [(7a)]](wo) will constitute trivially true answers, since all of them 
arise from computing the false antecedent of a conditional.7 
(7) a. Who checked every law that which American king had sanctioned? 
b. AWl Ap.3g,f [RCH(g)(WI) & RCH(f)(WI) & p = AW2.'VX [(laW(X)(W2) & 
sanction(x)(ftAmerican king))(W2)) � checked(x)(g(person))(w2) ] ]  
(8) Total Relativized "Choice" function wrt w: 
A function �<s,et>, e> is a relativized choice function wrt w (RCH(f)(w)) iff: 
(i) ftP) is a member ofP(w), ifP(w) is non-empty, and 
(ii) (P) "" * (the absurd individual, which is not in any natural language 
denotation), ifP(w) is empty. (adapted from von Stechow 1996) 
The main goal of this paper is to argue for a new architecture of choice 
functions that follows the basic choice function idea, but implements it with a 
higher type: « se,t>, <se» . The new proposal will be argued for in section 2 in 
two steps. First, based on examples of local presupposition accommodation 
(Romero 1 997), I will conclude that choice functions yield individual concepts 
more often than we thought, that is, that we need intensional choice functions even 
when there is no intensional operator embedded in the interrogative clause. As a 
corollary, the problem of empty N' -restrictors does not arise anymore. Second, 
from examples of which-phrases with transparent restrictor eliciting 
intensional answers, I will conclude that we need a new definition of intensional 
choice functions, closer to the basic choice funtion idea. 
A secondary, tentative goal of this paper is to shed some suspicion over the 
alleged Transparency Effect of which-phrases. In section 3 ,  I will show that, in 
Spanish, despite the fact that transparency effects often obtain, there are some 
indicators that N'-restrictors of que-phrases can be opaque: Subjunctive Relative 
Clauses in Spanish. 
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2. The Need of Intensional Choice Functions 
2. 1 .  Local Presupposition Cases 
The following examples --(9) and, in the scenario depicted in (10), ( 1 1 )-- involve 
local accommodation of the existence presuppositions triggered by the definite 
NPs his 1 younger sister and his 1 dog, namely the presuppositions "that there is a 
(unique) y that is g( 1 ) 's younger sister" and "that there is a y that is g(1 )'s dog".8 
(9) a. Mary didn't assume that any boYl in the class would bring his1 younger 
sister --since she knows that no boy in the class has a younger sister. 
b. AW.-,[Mary assumed in w (Aw'.3x [boy(x)(w') & 3y [ sister(x)(y)(w') 
& brought(y)(x)(w') ]] )] 
( 1 0) Scenario for ( 1 1 ) :  
We know that Lucie gets really mad at boys mistreating their dogs, to the 
point that she screams at them until she gets a sore throat. We don't know 
what pets the boys at today's contest own (i.e . ,  as far as we know, there 
may not be any dog-owning boy). We just know that, after the contest, her 
voice is in good condition. We estimate that there must have been at most 
one misbehaved dog-owning-boy, if any. 
( 1 1 )  a. At most one boYl (at today's contest) mistreated his1 dog. 
b. Aw.3s1x [ boy(x)(w) & 3y [dog-oftx)(y)(w) & mistreated(y)(x)(w) ] ] 
Parallel examples of local presupposition accommodation can be 
constructed with which phrases, too : 
( 12) Q: Who didn't assume that any boYl in the class would bring which relative 
of his1 --since that person knew that no boy in the class has such a 
relative? 
A: '" Mary didn't assume that any boYl in the class would bring his1 
younger sister --since Mary knows that no boy in the class has a 
younger sister. 
( 1 3) Q :  Which pet ofhis1 did at most one boYl (at today's contest) mistreat? 
A: (At most one boYl at today's contest mistreated) his1 dog. 
The current extensional choice function approaches do not account for 
these local presupposition readings. If we take basic or relativized choice functions 
to be total functions (Reinhart 1 997 for indefinites), then we cannot generate these 
readings. For the sake of illustration, let us see what happens if we try to generate 
a question denotation for ( 1 3Q) that contains the proposition expressed by the 
felicitous answer ( 1 3A). I will exemplify it under the relativized choice function 
approach, but the same reasoning carries over to basic choice functions. First, we 
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need a total choice function that picks dogs whenever possible but is still defined 
otherwise; that is, we need a function along the lines described in ( 14). Then, after 
computing the question meaning -as in ( 1 5b)--, we take the function fdog in ( 14) 
and obtain the proposition in (1 5c) as a member of [ [( 1 3Q)]](wo). The problem is 
that ( 1 5c) does not even come close to the proposition expressed by ( 1 3A), which 
we are trying to generate. More specifically, if, in the actual world Wo, none of the 
relevant boys owned a dog but they all mistreated all their existing pets, 
[ [( 1 3A)]](wo)=1 and ( 15c)(wo)=O. 
( 14) Example of total choice function, where RCH(fdoJ(wo): 
fdog: for all the N' P and for all relevant individuals x: 
fdog([[P of his1]]gxll) = x's dog if there is a (unique) dog ofx in [[P of 
his 1 ]](Wo); 
fdog([[P of his1]]gxl
l) yields some other member of [ [P of his1]](wo) 
otherwise. 
( 1 5) a. Which pet ofhis1 did at most one boYt mistreat? 
b. AWAp. 3f [ RCH(f)(w) & P = AW' . 3�IX [boy(x)(w') & mistreat 
(ftpet ofx» (x)(w')] ] 
c. AW' . 3Slx [boy(x)(w') & mistreat(fdog(pet ofx» (x)(w')] 
Extending the two strategies for empty N' -restrlctors to these examples 
will not yield the right result, either, as I noted in Romero ( 1 997). These strategies 
will overgenerate local presupposition accommodation readings, creating the very 
same problem that choice functions were meant to avoid: the problem of weak 
truth conditions. Let us briefly see why this is so. 
Let qs try the partial choice function strategy first. 
If we allow for partial relativized choice functions, like the ones described 
under ( 1 6), we have that, e.g., the term fdog([[pet of his 1 ] ]g) carries the 
presupposition that there is a (unique) dog of g(l )  in [[pet of his1]]�WO). The 
local accommodation reading of such presupposition is captured in the question 
meaning (17b) by inserting the subformula 5Y U(pet of x) =y]. Hence, if we take 
the partial fdog as a value for f, we generate the proposition ( 1 7  c) --paraphrased in 
( 1 7c') for perspicuity-- as a member of [ [( 1 7a)]](wo) .  And, since ( 1 7c) is arguably 
the proposition expressed by (some reading of) the answer ( 1 3A), ( 1 3A) is 
rendered as felicitous answer to ( 13Q). SO far, this is a welcome result. 
( 1 6) Examples of partial choice functions, where RCH(fdoJ(wo) and 
RCH(flIB)(wo), for the actual world Wo :  
fdog: for all the N' P and for all relevant individuals x: 
fdog([[P of his1]]gxl
l) = x's dog if there is a (unique) dog ofx in [ [P of 
his1]](wo); 
fdoi[[P ofhis1]]gxll) is undefined otherwise. 
flIB: for all the N' P and for all relevant individuals x: 
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fHB([[P of his1]]gx/l) = Humphrey Bogart if Humphrey Bogart is in [ [P 
of his1]](wo); 
fHB([[P of his1]]gx/l) is undefined otherwise. 
( 1 7) a. Which pet ofhisl did at most one boYl mistreat? 
b. AWAp. 3f [ RCH(t)(w) & p = AW' . 3,sIX [boy(x)(w') & 3y [ ftpet of 
x)=y & mistreat(y)(x)(w')] ] ] 
c. AW' . 3,sIX [boy(x)(w') & 3y [ !dog(pet ofx)=y & mistreat(y)(x)(w')] ] 
c' . The proposition "that there is at most one boy among whose actual 
pets there is one chosen by !dog and mistreated by him". 
The problem is that, by the same token, we can pick fHB in ( 1 6) as the 
value of f and locally accommodate the presupposition of the resulting term 
fHB([[pet of his 1 ] ]g), that is, the presupposition that H. Bogart is in [[pet of 
his1]]�WO). Note that the only explicit restriction on possible values for f in the 
question meaning (17b) is that that value be a RCH with respect to the evaluation 
world of the question. Hence, if we evaluate the question under Wo, the function 
fHB described in ( 16) is as good a value for f as !dog was. Also, it is difficult to find 
an implicit contextual restriction that would rule fHB out and !dog in, since, in 
principle, a function choosing H. Bogart is as plausible as a function choosing a 
dog. In sum, there is no overt nor covert restriction that prevents us from 
generating (1 7d) -paraphrased in ( 1 7d'}- as a member of [ [( 1 SQ)]](wo), and, 
thus, we elicit ( 1 SA-A') in their local accommodation reading as felicitous (even 
true) answers to ( 1 SQ) (cf. (2c) and fit. 2). This is an unwelcome result. 
( 17) d .  AW' . 3Slx [boy(x)(w') & 3y [ fHB(pet ofx)=y & mistreat(y)(x)(w')] ] 
d' . The proposition ''that there is at most one boy among whose actual 
pets there is one chosen by fHB and mistreated by that boy". 
( I S) Q: Which pet ofhisl did at most one boYl (at today's contest) mistreat? 
A: # (At most one boYl mistreated) hisl pet Humphrey Bogart. 
A' : # (At most one boYl mistreated) Humphrey Bogart. 
Let me note that this is exactly the same problem of weak truth conditions 
that we encountered at the beginning of this paper. If the reader has the patience to 
compare the question meaning at issue ( 1 7b) with (2b), she will recognize the same 
problematic configuration: we existentially quantify over objects of a certain 
semantic type with no overt nor obvious covert restriction. It is only in an 
embedded position in the formula that the desired restriction -being someone's 
philosophical rival or being a function with the property [ [relative of his1 ]]g in its 
domain-is predicated of the variable. This generates weak truth conditions, 
predicting non-sensical answers to be felicitous.9 
As for the falsifying object strategy, the same argument can be constructed 
against it. The relevant choice functions will now be total functions, as descno d in 
( 19): when the function cannot select a certain individual, it selects the absurd 
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individual, i.e. , the individual that, when combined with any predicate denotation, 
yields O. Note the new question meaning spelled out in (20b) and compare it with 
the former, ( 1 7b). Given the import of the absurd individual, the subformula 
mistreat(f(pet of x))(x)(w ') in (20b) has exactly the same truth conditions as the 
subformula � [f(pet ofx) =y & mistreat(y)(x)(w ,)] in ( l 7b). Hence, the argument 
above applies straightforwardly. 
( 19) Extension of the absurd individual strategy, where RCH(fdoJ(wo) and 
RCH(fHB)(wo), for the actual world Wo: 
fdog: for all the N' P and for all relevant individuals x: 
idog([[P of hisj]]gxll) = x's dog if there is a (unique) dog of x in [[P of 
hisj]](wo); 
fdog([[P ofhisj]]gxll) = the absurd individual otherwise. 
fHB: for all the N' P and for all relevant individuals x: 
fHB([[P of hisj]]gxll) = Humphrey Bogart ifHB is in [[P of hisj]](wo); 
fHB([[P of hisj]]gxll) = the absurd individual otherwise. 
(20) a. Which pet ofhisl did at most one boYI mistreat? 
b. AWAp. 3f [ RCH(t)(w) & p = AW' .  3S1x [boy(x)(w') & mistreat(ftpet 
ofx» (x)(w')] ] 
In sum, we have seen that (extensional) basic and relativized choice 
functions -no matter whether defined as in (4) and (6)/(8), modified for 
partiality/totality, or implemented under the falsifying individual strategy--, fail to 
account for the local presupposition accommodation readings at issue. 
I propose to generate these readings by using choice functions that do not 
yield individuals (type e), but individual concepts (type <s,e» ; that is, I propose to 
use intensional choice functions. A first definition is given under (2 1 ) :  
(2 1 )  Intensional "Choice" Function: f «e,st>, <se» (Heim 1994) 
A function f E D« e,st>, <se» is an intensional choice function (ICH(t) iff, 
for all P in the domain offand for all w in the domain offtP): 
P (ftP)(w» (w) = 1 
The crucial feature of intensional choice functions is that they provide 
another term to anchor the (to-be-Iocally-accommodated) existence 
presupposition. Instead of building partiality into the choice function itself -which 
we saw leads to weak truth conditions--, we make the value of the choice function 
-i.e., the individual concept-- partial. The formula representing the local 
presupposition accommodation reading is spelled out in (22b) : 
(22) a. Which pet ofhisl did at most one boYI mistreat? 
b. AwAp. 3f [ ICH(t)(w) & p = AW' . 3S1x [boy(x)(w') & 3y [ ftpet of x) 
(w') =y & mistreat(y)(x)(w')] ] ] 
26 1 
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Are we deriving now only the desired local presupposition readings, with 
no overgeneration? The answer is yes. Take the intensional choice function 
sketched in (23) as one of the values for f. That makes the proposition (22c) a 
member of the question denotation. The sentence (22A) expresses precisely this 
proposition (possibly among others). Hence, (22A) is correctly elicited as felicitous 
answer under its local presupposition accommodation reading. 
(23) Example oftotal intensional choice function, ICH(fI') : 
fI' :  for all relevant individuals x: 
fI'([[pet of his]]]gx/l) = the partial individual concept "the pet ofx that 
is x' s dog", 
fI'([[book of his]]]gx/l) = the partial individual concept "the book of x 
that is x's latest book", 
etc. 
(22) c. Aw' .3s1x[boy(x)(w') & 3y [ fI'(pet ofx)(w')=y & mistreat(y)(x)(w')] ] 
A: At most one boYI (at today's contest) mistreated hisl dog. 
Now consider the functions sketched in (24) and (25), potential source of 
unfelicitous answers. (24) is immediately ruled out because the values for f are 
explicitly restricted to intensional choice functions, and (24) is not one of them 
according to the definition (2 1) .  As for (25), we can rule it out by invoking a 
contextual restriction on sensible choice functions, so that only functions whose 
range contains plausible individual concepts are considered. Recall that this type of 
contextual restriction had no ground with extensional functions: the individual H. 
Bogart is as pragmatically plausible as some particular dogs, and, hence, the 
corresponding functions choosing them are equally sensible. Pragmatic factors help 
us only with intensional choice functions. 
(24) f+: for all relevant individuals x: 
f+([[pet of his]]]gx/l) = the constant individual concept "H. Bogart", 
etc. 
(25) f': for all relevant individuals x: 
f'([[pet of his] ]]gx/l) = the partial individual concept "the pet of x that 
is H. Bogart", 
etc. 
(Some version of) intensional choice functions is needed independently in 
order to account for examples like (26) (Engdahl 1 980, 1 986), where the NP in the 
answer is interpreted de dicto under the (elided) attitude verb believe. What I have 
proposed in this paper is to use intensional choice functions even when there is no 
embedded intensional operator involved. I have used them to generate local 
presupposition readings independently of embedded intensional contexts, but, of 
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course, once this is so, it could be argued that we can use them independently of 
presupposition accommodation as well. I leave the latter issue open in this paper. 10  
(26) Q: Which book did John believe that every authorl would read from? 
A: From his 1 latest one -whichever that may be. (Engdahl 1 986: 1 67) 
As a corollary, once we decide to use intensional choice functions even 
when no intensional operator intervenes, the problem of empty N' -restrictors does 
not even arise. Recall the oddity of example (7a), repeated as (27Q), and the two 
strategies used to confront it : to make choice functions partial (which we just saw 
leads to weak truth conditions) or to stipulate a special (trivially) falsifying value 
for empty N' -restrictors. With intensional choice functions, empty N' -restrictors 
are accounted for straighforwardly. For example, in (27), the question denotation 
[[(27Q)]](wo) contains the proposition (27b), which, in principle, elicits (27 A) as a 
felicitous answer. However, (27 A) -and any other answer elicited by the question 
meaning (27a)-- is a case of presupposition failure: the presupposition that there is 
an oldest king of America projects to the top node of the declarative sentence, but 
it is not met in the actua1/background world(s) . The oddness of question (27A) is, 
hence, due to the lack of felicitous propositions that would count as answers in woo 
This account avoids the shortcomings of the previous strategies. 
(27) Q: # Who checked every law that which American king had sanctioned? 
a. A.WI A.P: 3g,f [ICH(g) & ICH(f) & p = A.w.'Vx [ ( law(x)(w) & sanction 
(x) (f{American king)) (w) ) -+ checked(x)(g(person))(w) ] ]  
b. A.w.'Vx [ ( law(x)(w) & sanction (x) (foldest(American king)) (w) ) -+ 
checked(x)(g(person))(w) ] 
A: # Martin checked every law that the oldest American king had 
sanctioned. 
This concludes subsection 2. 1 .  Individual concepts as the value of choice 
functions are needed independently in order to account for intensional answers, as 
we saw in (26). The conclusion of this subsection is simply that we need individual 
concepts more often than we thought, namely when there is no embedded 
intensional context. Once this is so, empty N' -restrictors do not need a special 
treatment. 1 1 
2. 2. Transparent Which Phrases Eliciting Intensional Answers. 
This subsection presents data that call for a redefinition of intensional choice 
functions. I repeat the current definition under (28). According to this definition, 
the resulting individual concept � will necessarily assign each world w in its 
domain to an individual that has the original property P in w. To say it more 
intuitively, each property in the domain of the choice function is mapped onto a 
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sort of "subconcept" of that property (e.g. [ [red apple]] may be mapped to ''the 
leftmost red apple", but not to ''the leftmost apple"). 
(28) Intensional "Choice" Function: f <<e,st>, <se» (Heim 1 994) 
A function f E D« e st> <se» is an intensional choice function (ICH(f)) iff, , , 
for all P in the domain of f and for all w in the domain of f{P) : 
P (ftP)(w)) (w) = 1 
This characterization of intensional choice functions proves too narrow in 
view of the following examples. The intended readings, prompted by the 
corresponding scenarios, take the N' -restrictor of the which phrase as transparent 
with respect to want and the chosen individual concept as de dicto with respect to 
the same verb. 12  
(29) Scenario for (30) :  
Petra, an innocent four year old that simpathizes with old dogs, wants 
every friend of hers to play with the oldest dog in that friend's 
neighborhood, whatever that dog may be. Unbeknownst to her, rabies has 
affected all dogs, squirrels and raccoons in the surrounding neighborhoods. 
(30) Q:  Which animal that may give him} rabies does Petra want every friend} 
of hers to play with? 
A: The oldest dog in his} neighborhood --whichever that dog is. 
(3 1 )  Scenario for (32) : 
Martin is looking for the Dean of the University of Barcelona, whoever 
that is. Martin does not know that such Dean is a civil servant depending 
on the Catalan Government (called "Generality") and not on the Spanish 
government. In fact, Martin has no beliefs about the Dean's affiliation nor 
has narrowed down the Dean's identity to any particular set of people. 
(32) Q:  Which Generality civil servant does Martin want to talk to? 
A: The Dean of the University of Barcelona -whoever that is. 
The functions defined in (28) do not derive these readings. Let us see why 
with the last example. First, take the property [[Generality civil servant]]8, defined 
in (33), as the argument of one of those functions. The resulting individual concept 
may be ''the Generality civil servant that is the Dean of the U.B.". Crucially, the 
"chosen" individual concept cannot be the individual concept ''the Dean of the 
U.B.", since this concept maps each world w in its domain onto the Dean in w 
independently of the Dean's affiliation in w. Yet, it is precisely the latter concept 
that we need in order to generate the desired reading: Martin's desire worlds 
include worlds where the Dean is affiliated to the Generality and worlds where 
shelhe is not, and Martin talks to the Dean in all of those worlds independently of 
the Dean's affiliation. 
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(33) AWAX. Generality-civil-servant (x)(w) 
Similarly, if we take the property in (34) as the argument of one of those 
functions, we end up with the wrong individual concept as well. 13 Let us pretend 
that, in the actual world Wo, {a,b,c,d,e} is the exhaustive set of Generality civil 
servants. The individual concept "chosen" out of that property will be '1he 
individual in {a,b,c,d,e} that is the Dean of the U.B.". Again, this is not the 
concept we are looking for, since Martin has not narrowed down the identity of 
the Dean to any particular set of people and, hence, his desire worlds should 
include worlds where the Dean is none of the actual Generality civil servants. 
(34) AWAX. Generality-civil-servant (x)(wo) 
We need a new definition of intensional choice function. The possibility I 
will pursue in this paper splits the work done by the old definition into two 
components. 14 For the first ingredient -a new definition of intensional choice 
functions--, I follow the basic notion of choice function but implement it with 
intensional types: basic intensional choice functions select an individual concept 
out of a set of individual concepts, as defined in (35) :  
(35) Basic intensional choice function definition: 
A function f E D« se t> <se» is a basic intensional choice function 
(BASICH(f) iff for all P iIi the domain of f: P(ftP» = 1 
As the second ingredient, I propose that some natural language expressions 
are ambiguous between a property of individuals meaning and a property of 
individual concepts meaning, as indicated in (36) . For example, [ [Generality civil 
servant<s., et>]](wo) would be a set of individuals, and [ [Generality civil servant<s, 
<se,t»]](wo) would be a set of individual concepts, containing, among others, the 
concept ''the Dean of the University of Barcelona". 
(36) [[Generality civil servant]] is ambiguous: 
a. Property of individuals: type <S, <e, t» 
b. Property of individual concepts: type <s, <se,t» 
The question arises what determines, in a given world w, whether an 
individual concept belongs to [[Generality civil servant<s, <se.t»]](w) or not. In 
other words, what is the relation between the <s,et> meaning of Generality civil 
servant and its <s, <se,t» meaning, if any? Although the answer to this question 
and its justification fall beyond the aims of this paper, I will briefly speculate with 
some ideas for the reader to see how the system would work. Recall that we want 
to preserve the virtues that the original intensional choice function definition had in 
the previous subsection while allowing for the new set of examples. That is, our 
desiderata are the following: 
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(37) a. All proper "subconcepts" can be the output of a choice function, no 
matter whether the <S,et> type denotation of the N' -restrictor happens 
to be empty in the relevant evaluation world or not. [Choice functions 
selecting implausible "subconcepts" are ruled out pragmatically.] 
b. Some non-"subconcepts" cannot be selected by & choice function. E.g.,  
if the N'-restrictor is pet of his] and, in the relevant evaluation world, 
the individual Humphrey Bogart is not a pet of g( 1 ), the choice 
function cannot yield the individual concept "Humphrey Bogart". 
c.  Some non-"subconcepts" can be selected by a choice function. E.g., if 
the N' -restrictor is Generality civil servant and, in the relevant world, 
the individual that is the Dean of the U.B. is also a Generality civil 
servant, the choice function can yield the individual concept ''the Dean 
of the U.B." 
Let us address our desideratum (37c) first, that is, let us make sure we are 
able to select the concept ''the Dean of the U.B." simpliciter out of the set 
[[Generality civil servant<s, <se,t»]](w), W being the N-bar's evaluation world. This 
can be achieved if we assume the relation in (38), which proposes a rather weak 
condition: in order for the individual concept to belong to that set, the value of the 
individual concept needs to have the relevant property just in the evaluation world. 
Hence, in a world w where the person that is the Dean of the U.B. is a Generality 
civil servant, both the "subconcept" ''the Generality civil servant that is the Dean of 
the U.B." and the concept ''the Dean of the U.B." belong to that set, as desired. 
(38) For any natural language expression P ambiguous between type <s,et> and 
type <S,<se,t» , for any weDs, any �eD<s,e>, [TO BE REVISED] 
[ [P<s, <se,t» ]](w)(�)=1 iff [ [P<s, <e,t» ] ](w)(�(w» =1 
So far, so good. But note that now we have partly flawded our 
desideratum (37a) :  we cannot generate proper "subconcepts" in the case of empty 
N'-restritors. To see this, consider what would count as an American king concept 
in the actual world. Intuitively, we might include the following: ''the first American 
king", ''the shortest American king", ''the bastard American king", etc. None of 
these concepts belongs to [ [American king<s, <se,t» ] ](wo) according to (38), since 
none of these concepts is defined in Wo, to begin with. 
What we need is an even weaker condition, where the relation between the 
individual concept � and the <s, et> property holds in the evaluation world w if the 
� is defined in w, and in some other world otherwise. One possible implementation 
is that such relation must hold in the possible worlds most similar to the evaluation 
world w where the individual concept is defined. This idea is spelled out in (39): 
(39) For any natural language expression P ambiguous between type <s,et> and 
type <s,<se,t» , for any weDs, and for any �eD<s,e>, 
[ [P<s, <se,t»]](w)(�) iff 
'v'w' [(w' eDom(�) & w' is similar to w otherwise) -+[[P<s, <e,t»]] (w)(�(w» ] 
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Under (39), [ [American king<s, <se,t»]](wo) contains the concept ''the first 
American king", since, in the w' most similar to Wo where there is an individual 
that is the first American king, that individual is certainly an American king. That 
is, according to (39), proper "subconcepts" are always included in the denotation 
of an <s, <se,t» type restrictor, no matter whether the <et> type denotation of 
that N' -restrictor in the evaluation world is empty or not. Therefore, our 
desideratum (37a) is now completely fulfilled. 
Finally, let us make sure that the desideratum (37b) is met. Let us take a 
world w where Humphrey Bogart exists and is not a pet of g(1 ) .  For the individual 
concept "Humphrey Bogart" to belong to and, thus, be selectable from [[pet of 
his1 <s, <se,t» ]]g(w) , the following would have to hold: in the world w' most similar 
to w where Humphrey Bogart exists -i.e. ,  in w itself--, the individual Humphrey 
Bogart is a pet of g(l)  in w' -i.e. ,  in w itself By assumption, this is not the case, 
and, hence, this non-"subconcept" cannot be selected by a choice function out of 
[[pet of his] <s, <se,t» ]]g(w). 
Let me recapitulate the import of this subsection. We started with Heim's 
( 1994) definition of intensional "choice" functions, which had yielded good results 
in the previous section. Then, examples of transparent which phrases eliciting 
intensional answers motivated a revision. I proposed a more liberal definition, 
where basic intensional choice functions select an individual concept out of the 
<se,t> type denotation of an N'-restrictor. I also sketched a possible way to relate 
<s,<se,t» meanings and <s,et> meanings so that the accomplishments of the 
original intensional choice function approach would be preserved and the new data 
could be derived. 
To conclude, this entire section 2 has proposed some changes in the 
architecture (semantic type and definition) of choice functions: we need choice 
functions that yield individual concepts even in questions with no embedded 
intensional context, so as to derive the local presupposition data; such functions 
must also derive intensional answers for which phrases with transparent N'­
restrictors, a goal for which I have suggested a possible analysis. 
3. Indicators of opaque N'-restrictor: Spanish Subjunctive Relative Clauses 
This section is concerned with another aspect of some current choice function 
implementations, namely what I have dubbed ''Transparency Effect". As advanced 
at the beginning of this paper, Reinhart ( 1992, 1 997) observes that the choice 
function in (40) must select an individual from the wo-extension of philosopher; it 
cannot choose an individual that has the relevant property only in the conditional 
worlds: 
(40) Q: Who will be upset ifwe invite which philosopher? (Reinhart 1 992 :(4)) 
A: Pat will be upset if we invite David Lewis. 
A' : # Pat will be upset ifwe invite Donald Duck. 
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Spanish que-phrases show the same Transparency Effect in (41) .  However, 
there are some indicators in Spanish that N' -restrictors of which phrases are not 
necessarily transparent, i.e.� that choice functions may sometimes choose from the 
extension of the N' -restrictor in some embedded intensional context world. The 
aim of this section is to present those Spanish data and, hence, to shed some 
suspicion on the current explanation for the Transparency Effect, ie. ,  on relativized 
choice functions. I will leave alternative explanations for future research. 
(41 )  Q:  Quien se enfadaraJenfadaria si invitamoslinvitasemos a que fil6sofo? 
Who wiWwould-be-upset ifwe invite/invited which(/what) philosopher 
A' : #Patricia se enfadaraJenfadaria si invitamoslinvitasemos al Pato Donald. 
Patricia wiWwould-be-upset ifwe invited the Donald Duck 
In Spanish, mood in Relative Clauses (RCs, henceforth) correlates with 
their w-interpretation under certain intensional contexts (e.g. ,  conditionals and 
desire attitudes) (Farkas 1 997, Quer 1 998) . Indicative RCs, on the one hand, are 
interpreted as transparent with respect to those intensional contexts, as in (42) : the 
DP at least 1 00 people that are rich takes scope inside the if-clause, and the 
Indicative RC is evaluated in the actual world woo Subjunctive RCs, on the other 
hand, are opaque, as (43) shows: Subjunctive forces us to evaluate the RC in the 
conditional worlds, which renders (43a) pragmatically non-sensical; once this 
pragmatic oddity is removed� the construction is fine «43b)) : 1 5  
(42) Seria feliz si al menos 1 00 personas que son-Ind ricas fuesen pobres. 
I-would-be happy if at least 1 00 people that are-Ind rich were poor 
(from Farkas' example in English) 
(43) a.#Seria feliz si al menos 1 00 personas que fuesen-Sub ricas fuesen pobres. 
b. Seria feliz si al menos 1 00 personas que fuesen-Sub ricas donasen 
I-would-be happy if at least 1 00 people that were-Sub rich gave 
parte de su fortuna a los pobres. 
part of their fortune to the poor 
The first point I would like to make is that Subjunctive RCs can modify 
which phrases too, yielding the same opacity symptoms as in other DPs. Compare 
the Indicative (44a) and the Subjunctive (44b). According to the former, there has 
to be a non-empty set that fulfills the N' -description in Wo, though the subject 
Tomas may not think that that set of people has that property. In the latter, there 
need not be anybody fulfi])jng the N' -property in the actual world, but certainly 
there has to be somebody like that in Tomas' doxasticlbouletic alternatives. 
(44) a. Q: [ A  que chica2 que (no) se acuerda-Ind de ell] qui ere 
To which(/what) woman that (not) REFL remember ofhim wants 
TomasI que le2 pidas el nu.mero de telefono? 
Tomas that CL ask-2sg-Subj the number oftelephone 
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'Which woman2 that (doesn't) remember(s) himl does Tomasi 
want you to ask for her2 phone number?' 
A: A Claudia. 'Claudia' 
b. Q:  [A que chica2 que se acuerde-Sub de ell] quiere Tomasi que le2 
pidas el nfunero de telefono? 
A: A la mas simpatica -quienquiera que sea. 
'The neatest one -whoever that is. '  
The contrast Indicative/Subjunctive tells us something about the w­
interpretation of the RC, not about whether the requested answer should be 
extensional (de re) or intensional (a de dicto individual concept). This can be seen 
in (45) : transparent RCs in which phrases with intensional answers use Indicative. 
(45) Q: [Con que animal que puede-Ind contagiarles la rabia] quiere 
With which/what animal that may give-them the rabies] wants 
M6nica que todos sus amigos jueguen? 
M6nica that all her friends play-Subj.  
'With which(/what) animal that may give them rabies does 
M6nica want all her friends to play?' 
A: 'With the oldest dog in the neighborhood -whatever that dog may be. ' 
The second point of this section is that, although the Transparency Effect 
often obtains, examples with Subjunctive RCs can be constructed where this effect 
is overriden: in contrast with (4 1 ), the answer to (46) does not presuppose that 
Paco is about to get married in Wo; he is an imminent groom only in the conditional 
worlds. This reading of (46) is formalized in (47a), and the relevant aspects of the 
choice function are described in (47b). 
(46) Q: [Quien se enfadarfa si que familiar suyo que estuviera-Sub a punto 
Who would-be-upset ifwhich relative of-his that was-Sub about 
de casarse] no Ie llamara para decfrselo? 
to-get-married not himlher called to tell-himlher 
'Who I would be upset if which/what relative of hisl that was-Sub 
about to get married didn't call himl to tell himl ?' 
A: Pedro se enfadarfa si su primo Paco estuviera a punto de casarse y no Ie 
llamara para decfrselo . 
'Peter would be upset if his cousin Paco was about to get married and 
didn't call him to tell him. ' 
(47) a. AWAp. 3g,f [ BASICH(g) & BASICH(t) & p = AW.VW" [ 3x [tt[[r-his] 
-marry<s<se.t» ]]�w
"))(w")=x & ..,call (g([[person]](w))(w")) (x) (w") 
& wIt is like W otherwise] � upset (g([fperson]](w))(w"))(w") ] ] 
h. For all the wIt in which the antecedent ofthe conditional holds: 
f ([[relative o/his] about to get married<s<se.t» ]]�w
")) = 
"the relative of g( l )  about to get married that is g( l )'s cousin Paco",  or, 
"g( l )'s cousin Paco".  
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In sum, Spanish que-phrases, like English which-phrases, often yield 
Transparency Effects. However, we have seen that they take opaque Relative 
Clauses as restrictors and that, sometimes, the Transparency Effect is overriden 
This suggest that choice functions for which phrases are not committed to select 
from the extension of the N' -restritor in the evaluation world of the question, as 
the relativized choice function approach proposed. Instead, they may choose from 
the N' -extension in some other embedded worlds, possibility that the basic choice 
function line allows for. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has argued for a wider distribution of intensional choice functions for 
which phrases, and for a basic choice function implementation of them. First, from 
data on local presupposition accommodation, I concluded that we have intensional 
choice functions more often than we thought. As a corollary, the problem of empty 
N' -restrictors disappears. Second, based on data on transparent which-phrases 
eliciting intensional answers, I proposed to reformulate intensional choice 
functions in terms of the basic choice function idea: an intensional choice function 
chooses an individual concept out of a set of individuals concepts. Third, with data 
on Spanish Subjunctive Relatives, I have shown that the Spanish correlates of 
which (or what) phrases may take opaque restrictors. This casts doubt on an 
account that handles the Transparency Effect as a grammatical fact (i.e. ,  on 
relativized choice functions); the basic choice function line is, thus, preferrable. 
Endnotes 
* I thank: 1. Heim, A. Kratzer and B. Partee for their valuable comments at several 
stages of this paper. The final version has also benefitted from the audiences at 
Umass, the MIT LF-group, IRCS at Penn, and SALT 9.  Remaining erros are mine. 
1 Actually, Karttunen's question denotation in a given w is the set of felicitous true 
answers of the described shape; i.e. the formula p(w) would be inserted within 
( 1 b) .  This detail is tangential to the present paper. 
2 (2c) would even count as (trivially) true answer ifphilosopher is evaluated in w. 
3 The alternative wide scope line uses skolem functions instead. For data 
suggesting that the base position line is empirically superior, see Fox ( 1 997) and 
Romero (forth.) (variable binding produces Principle C Connectivity Effects) and 
Ruys ( 1 992) (distributive readings out of islands are impossible for indefinites, an 
argument that is extensible to which-phrases). 
4 More accurately, which would not range over choice functions, but over 
functions from individuals to choice functions, as Kratzer ( 1 998 : 1 68) proposes for 
a certain. I will ignore this detail for the purposes of this paper. 
S I freely switch between sets and their characteristic functions. 
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6 This is so in Bochvar's three-valued logic. In Kleene's  system, the prediction is 
that (7a) denotes in Wo the set of propositions p that have the following 
characteristic: for a given choice function g, p is such that, for any w', p(w')=1 if 
g(person) checked absolutely all the laws in w' , and undefined otherwise. 
7 In the RCH approach,f(American king) abbreviates f([[ American king<s,et> JJ). 
8 Beaver ( 1 995 :2 1 4) provides examples similar to (9), e.g. (i), which he concedes 
is compatible with there being no priceless Modigliani owners. He notes that this 
type of local presupposition arises from presupposition triggers containing a bound 
variable pronoun. Since his semantic rules do not derive this reading and I do not 
know of any other solution, I will consider that it arises from local presupposition 
accommodation (in the sense of Heim 1 983) within the quantifier' s nuclear scope. 
(i) No man discovered / regretted that he owned a priceless Modigliani. 
9 Exactly the same reasoning applies to partial basic choice functions. The only 
difference is that, with basic functions, we could also evaluate the N' -restrictor 
under w' in the formulae ( 1 7b-c-d) and generate what Groenendijk-Stokhof ( 1 982) 
call de dicto reading. The same weak truth conditions obtain. 
10 A potential example of intensional answer without embedded intensional context 
and without local presupposition accommodation is (iQ)-(iA') (cf. (iA)): 
(i) Q: Who won the Tour de France in 1 980? (G&S 1 982 :228) 
A: Joop Zoeteme1k. 
A' : The one who ended second in 1 979. 
Groenendijk-Stokhof ( 1 982) consider that the extensional answer (iA) is somehow 
part of the denotation of the question, but that the seemingly intensional (iA') is 
not; the latter is elicited indirectly, under some extended notion of answerhood. If 
we extend the findings of our paper to questions with no local presupposition 
accommodation, (iQ) has a question denotation that elicits (iA') directly. 
I I  Much of what I have said in this subsection 2. 1 applies to the so-called 
"specific" indefinites and their analysis in terms of choice functions (Reinhart 1 997, 
Winter 1 997, Kratzer 1 998). Space constraints keep me from elaborating on it. 
12 I assume that the definite description the oldest dog in hisl neighborhood in 
(30A) does not result from a choice function selecting a kind, since singular 
definite descriptions can only refer to standardly recognized kinds (e.g. ,  the bottle, 
but not the green bottle) (Carlson 1 977). The same considerations extend to (32) 
(the reader may take the DP the shortest Dean of the U.B. if she prefers so) .  1 3 I thank Angelika Kratzer for suggesting that I try this possibility. 
14  What I will present is just one possibility, but certainly others come to mind. 
For instance, if we accept that a subject can have a de re attitude not just towards 
an individual but also towards an individual concept (see Sharvit 1 998), we may 
implement Heim's intensional "choice" function definition with higher types and 
obtain the desired results. I leave this possibility open for further research. 
I S Giannakidou ( 1 998) argues that, in Modem Greek, what Subjunctive indicates 
is non-veridicality, and that the Greek RC correlation Indicative-de re and 
Subjunctive-de dicto is a by-product of that (p. 9 1 ) .  Although it might be possible 
to derive the Spanish correlation Indicative-transparent and Subjunctive-opaque 
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from non-veridicality as well (despite of some important differences: Greek definite 
DPs (Giannakidou ( 1 998 :90) and which-phrases (Giannakidou, p.c.) do not accept 
Subjunctive RCs, as opposed to Spanish), the relevant fact is the correlation itseI£ 
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